Effects of patents versus R&D subsidies on income inequality by Chu, Angus C & Cozzi, Guido
E¤ects of Patents versus R&D Subsidies on Income
Inequality
Angus C. Chu Guido Cozzi
December 2017
Abstract
This study explores the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on innova-
tion and income inequality using a Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous
households. We nd that although strengthening patent protection and raising R&D
subsidies have the same macroeconomic e¤ects of stimulating innovation and economic
growth, they have drastically di¤erent microeconomic implications on income inequal-
ity. Specically, strengthening patent protection increases income inequality whereas
raising R&D subsidies decreases (increases) it if the quality step size is su¢ ciently
small (large). An empirically realistic quality step size is smaller than the threshold,
implying a negative e¤ect of R&D subsidies on income inequality. We also calibrate the
model to provide a quantitative analysis and nd that strengthening patent protection
causes a moderate increase in income inequality and a negligible increase in consump-
tion inequality whereas raising R&D subsidies causes a relatively large decrease in both
income inequality and consumption inequality.
JEL classication: D30, O30, O40
Keywords: R&D subsidies, patents, income inequality, economic growth
Chu: angusccc@gmail.com. China Center for Economic Studies, School of Economics, Fudan University,
Shanghai, China. Cozzi: guido.cozzi@unisg.ch. Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen, St.
Gallen, Switzerland. The authors would like to thank Matthias Doepke (the Editor), an anonymous Associate
Editor and two anonymous Referees for their insightful comments and Xilin Wang for his helpful research
assistance.
1
1 Introduction
The seminal study by Solow (1956) shows that economic growth in the long run must come
from technological progress. The development of technologies in turn is driven by innovation
and R&D. Therefore, patent protection and R&D subsidies are two important policy instru-
ments that determine technological progress and economic growth. Since the development
of the innovation-driven growth model by Romer (1990), many studies have used variants of
the innovation-driven growth model to explore the macroeconomic e¤ects of patent protec-
tion and R&D subsidies on innovation and economic growth. However, the microeconomic
implications of these two policy instruments on the income distribution have received much
less attention. Therefore, in this study, we explore the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D
subsidies on innovation as well as income inequality. We nd that whether the relation-
ship between innovation and inequality, which are both endogenous variables, is positive or
negative depends on the underlying exogenous driving force (i.e., patent policy versus R&D
subsidy).
The growth-theoretic framework that we consider is the Schumpeterian growth model.
We extend it by allowing for heterogeneous households who have di¤erent levels of asset hold-
ings. As Piketty (2014) argues, an unequal distribution of wealth is an important cause of
income inequality. Within this growth-theoretic framework, we nd that although strength-
ening patent protection and raising R&D subsidies have the same macroeconomic e¤ects of
stimulating innovation and economic growth, they have drastically di¤erent microeconomic
implications on income inequality. Therefore, it is important to consider beyond aggregate
e¤ects and investigate distributional implications when evaluating the overall e¤ects of a
policy instrument.
When a strengthening of patent protection or a raise in R&D subsidies leads to a higher
rate of economic growth, the real interest rate also rises leading to an increase in asset income,
which is the cause of inequality in the model. As a result, strengthening patent protection and
raising R&D subsidies both have a positive e¤ect on income inequality via this interest-rate
channel. Intuitively, the higher interest rate increases the income of asset-wealthy households
relative to asset-poor households. Furthermore, the two policy instruments carry an asset-
value e¤ect that a¤ects income inequality. By increasing monopolistic prots, strengthening
patent protection increases asset value and causes an additional positive e¤ect on income
inequality. In contrast, raising R&D subsidies suppresses income inequality by reducing asset
value through creative destruction1 and consequently causing a decrease in asset income. As
a result of the opposing interest-rate and asset-value e¤ects, raising R&D subsidies has
an overall ambiguous e¤ect on income inequality. Specically, if the quality step size is
smaller (larger) than a threshold, then raising R&D subsidies leads to a lower (higher)
degree of income inequality. An empirically realistic quality step size is smaller than the
threshold implying a negative e¤ect of R&D subsidies on income inequality. In contrast,
a strengthening of patent protection causes a positive e¤ect on income inequality. This
theoretical result is consistent with the empirical nding in Adams (2008) who uses an index
of patent rights constructed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and nds that strengthening patent
1This creative-destruction e¤ect on asset value is also present in the case of patent protection but is o¤set
by its monopolistic-prot e¤ect.
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protection has a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on income inequality. Therefore,
it may seem that pro-growth policies tend to worsen income inequality; however, our analysis
shows that this may be true for patent policy but not so for R&D subsidies.
The above results are partly due to an implicit assumption that R&D subsidies a¤ect
only new inventions whereas patent breadth a¤ects both new inventions and previously
patented inventions, which are assets owned by households. This assumption is realistic
because R&D subsidies only compensate rms for carrying out new innovation whereas
increasing patent breadth enhances protection for future and current patents.2 It is also
important to emphasize that the above results are not due to a common misinterpretation of
the Schumpeterian model that innovation comes from entrants but not incumbents. Cozzi
(2007) shows that the correct interpretation of creative destruction in the Schumpeterian
model is that incumbents choice of R&D is simply indeterminate, so that the aggregate
economy behaves as if innovation is targeted only by entrants. In other words, creative
destruction in the Schumpeterian model can be consistent with the empirical observation
that incumbents often target innovation at their own industries.
We also explore the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on consumption
inequality. We nd that strengthening patent protection increases consumption inequality
whereas raising R&D subsidies continues to have an overall ambiguous e¤ect on consumption
inequality. Finally, we calibrate the model to investigate the quantitative e¤ects of patent
protection and R&D subsidies on growth and inequality. The policy experiments that we
consider are to increase separately the rate of R&D subsidies and the level of patent protec-
tion such that the R&D share of GDP increases by one-tenth in each case, which in turn leads
to the same proportional increase in the equilibrium growth rate. We nd that the increase
in patent protection causes a moderate increase in income inequality and a negligible increase
in consumption inequality whereas the increase in R&D subsidies causes a relatively large
decrease in both income inequality and consumption inequality. These results are robust to
a number of robustness checks.
This study relates to the literature on R&D and economic growth. The seminal studies
in this literature are Romer (1990), Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991)
and Aghion and Howitt (1992). Subsequent studies in this literature apply variants of the
R&D-based growth model to explore the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on
innovation and economic growth;3 see for example Peretto (1998), Li (2001), Lin (2002, 2015),
Furukawa (2007), Futagami and Iwaisako (2007), Horii and Iwaisako (2007), Iwaisako and
Futagami (2013), Zeng and Zhang (2007), Zeng et al. (2014), Impullitti (2010), Acemoglu
and Akcigit (2012), Minniti and Venturini (2014) and Kiedaisch (2015). These studies focus
on a representative-household framework and do not consider the distributional implications
2It is useful to note that patent breadth refers to how broad claims in patents are (or are expected to be)
interpreted by patent judges in court.
3Many empirical studies have investigated the e¤ects of these two R&D policy instruments. Recent
examples include Minniti and Venturini (2017), who nd that R&D tax credits have positive e¤ects on
productivity growth, and Brown et al. (2017), who nd that protection for intellectual property has positive
e¤ects on R&D. Other studies such as Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), Bessen and Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and
Levine (2008), nd that patent protection may have blocking e¤ects on future innovation. We do not consider
blocking patents in this study; see for example Chu (2009), Chu et al. (2012), Cozzi and Galli (2014) and
Yang (2017) for an analysis of blocking patents in the Schumpeterian model.
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of patent protection and R&D subsidies. The current study lls this gap in the literature
by exploring the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on income inequality in
addition to growth within a Schumpeterian model with heterogeneous households.
Some studies in the literature consider heterogeneous workers and explore the relationship
between innovation and wage inequality. For example, Acemoglu (1998, 2002) develops an
R&D-based growth model with two R&D sectors and two types of workers to explore how
the direction of innovation a¤ects the skill premium. Li (1998) and Grossman and Helpman
(2016) also consider heterogeneous workers and wage inequality in an R&D-based growth
model with a uniform distribution of workers productivity in the former and a general
distribution of workersproductivity in the latter. Some studies such as Spinesi (2011), Pan
et al. (2012) and Cozzi and Galli (2014) analyze the e¤ects of patent protection on the skill
premium. The present study di¤ers from these studies by considering wealth heterogeneity
instead of worker heterogeneity and by exploring income inequality instead of wage inequality.
A small number of studies in the literature consider income and/or wealth heterogeneity
in the R&D-based growth model. Representative studies include Chou and Talmain (1996),
Zweimuller (2000), Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006), Aghion et al. (2015) and Jones and Kim
(2017). These studies focus on the relationship between income inequality and innovation.
Our study complements these interesting studies by showing that if patent policy (R&D
subsidy) changes, then the relationship between innovation and inequality would be positive
(negative). Furthermore, we explore the e¤ects of policy instruments not only on income in-
equality but also on consumption inequality. Chu (2010) and Kiedaisch (2016) also explore
the e¤ects of patent policy on inequality; however, they do not consider R&D subsidies.
Therefore, this study generalizes the analysis in Chu (2010) and Kiedaisch (2016) by provid-
ing a comparative analysis of two popular policy instruments, which appear to have similar
aggregate e¤ects but drastically di¤erent distributional implications. Furthermore, unlike
Chu (2010) and Kiedaisch (2016), we consider a lab-equipment innovation process under
which R&D uses nal goods (instead of labor) as input. Under the lab-equipment speci-
cation, strengthening patent protection causes the positive asset-value e¤ect in addition to
the positive interest-rate e¤ect on income inequality.4
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
explores the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies. Section 4 provides a quanti-
tative analysis. Section 5 considers a number of extensions of the model. The nal section
concludes.
4If we instead considered the knowledge-driven specication under which R&D uses labor as the factor in-
put, then the positive interest-rate e¤ect of both patent protection and R&D subsidies would still be present.
However, the positive asset-value e¤ect of patent protection would be absent because the monopolistic-prot
e¤ect would be exactly o¤set by the creative-destruction e¤ect in this case. As for the negative asset-value
e¤ect of R&D subsidies, it is robust to either R&D specication; therefore, our nding on the di¤erent e¤ects
of patent protection and R&D subsidies on inequality is also robust. See Section 5.1.
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2 A Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous
households
In this section, we extend the Schumpeterian quality-ladder model in Grossman and Help-
man (1991), which is a workhorse model in the literature, to allow for heterogeneous house-
holds with di¤erent asset holdings. Furthermore, we consider two policy instruments, patent
breadth and R&D subsidies, in order to perform a comparative policy analysis. We consider
these two policy instruments in our analysis because they have the same implications at the
macroeconomic level, which makes them easy to compare, by having the same e¤ects on
innovation and economic growth but drastically di¤erent implications at the microeconomic
level by having di¤erent e¤ects on inequality. Finally, we also modify the R&D specication
by assuming a lab-equipment innovation process as in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).5
2.1 Households
There is a unit continuum of households indexed by h 2 [0; 1] with identical preferences over
consumption ct(h) but di¤erent levels of asset holdings. Each household h has the following
utility function:6
u(h) =
Z 1
0
e t ln ct(h)dt. (1)
The parameter  > 0 is the subjective discount rate. Each household h supplies one unit
of labor7 to earn wage income and makes consumption-saving decision to maximize utility
subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:
_at(h) = rtat(h) + (1   t)wt   ct(h). (2)
at(h) is the real value of nancial assets (i.e., the share of monopolistic rms) owned by
household h. rt is the real interest rate. wt is the real wage rate.  t 2 (0; 1) is the rate of
a wage income tax collected by the government.8 From standard dynamic optimization, the
5In Section 5.1, we present an alternative version of our model with knowledge-driven innovation.
6Here we consider a log utility function for simplicity. In the case of an isoelastic utility function, the
positive interest-rate e¤ect of patent protection and R&D subsidies on income inequality would remain
unchanged because the real interest rate would still be increasing in the equilibrium growth rate. As for the
asset-value e¤ect on income inequality, it would still be di¤erent for the two instruments: patent protection
would have a positive asset-value e¤ect whereas R&D subsidies would have a negative asset-value e¤ect on
income inequality.
7For simplicity, we assume inelastic labor supply in which case all households have the same labor income
implying that labor income of an individual is independent of the individuals share of wealth in the economy.
Under elastic labor supply, a negative relationship between wealth and labor income would emerge (Chu,
2010), consistently with evidence - see the empirical studies summarized in García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky
(2006) who also consider the relationship between growth and inequality but in an AK model. The growth-
inequality relationship in our model would continue to hold under elastic labor supply.
8Alternatively, one can consider an asset income tax. Here we consider a wage income tax for two reasons.
First, it is non-distortionary and does not a¤ect aggregate equilibrium allocations. Second, if we nanced
R&D subsidies by a tax on asset income - which is the source of inequality in the model - then raising
R&D subsidies would cause an additional negative e¤ect on inequality, which would reinforce our nding of
a negative e¤ect of R&D subsidies on inequality.
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Euler equation is given by
_ct(h)
ct(h)
= rt   , (3)
which shows that the growth rate of consumption is the same across households such that
_ct(h)=ct(h) = _ct=ct for all h 2 [0; 1], where ct 
R 1
0
ct(h)dh is aggregate consumption.
2.2 Final good
Competitive rms produce nal good yt using the following Cobb-Douglas aggregator over
a unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods:
yt = exp
Z 1
0
lnxt(i)di

, (4)
where xt(i) denotes intermediate good i 2 [0; 1]. The conditional demand function for xt(i)
is given by
xt(i) =
yt
pt(i)
, (5)
where pt(i) is the price of xt(i).
2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries, which are also indexed by i 2 [0; 1], producing
di¤erentiated intermediate goods. In each industry i, there is a monopolistic industry leader,
who holds a patent on the latest technology and dominates the market until the arrival of
the next innovation.9 The production function of the leader in industry i is
xt(i) = z
nt(i)lt(i), (6)
where the parameter z > 1 is the step size of each quality improvement, nt(i) is the number of
quality improvements that have occurred in industry i as of time t, and lt(i) is the amount of
labor employed in industry i. Given the productivity level znt(i), the marginal cost function
of the leader in industry i is wt=znt(i). From Bertrand competition, the prot-maximizing
price is a constant markup over the marginal cost such that
pt(i) = 
wt
znt(i)
, (7)
where the markup   z is a policy parameter determined by the level of patent protection
in the economy.10 Given (7), the amount of monopolistic prot in industry i is
t(i) =
  1

pt(i)xt(i) =
  1

yt, (8)
9See Cozzi (2007) for a discussion of this Arrow replacement e¤ect.
10The presence of monopolistic prot attracts potential imitation; therefore, stronger patent protection
allows monopolistic producers to charge a higher markup without losing their markets to potential imitators.
This formulation of patent breadth captures Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) seminal insight on "breadth as the
ability of the patentee to raise price".
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and the wage payment in industry i is
wtlt(i) =
1

pt(i)xt(i) =
1

yt, (9)
where the second equality of (8) and (9) follows from (5).
2.4 R&D
Equation (8) shows that t(i) = t for all intermediate goods i 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, the value
of inventions is also the same across industries such that vt(i) = vt for all i 2 [0; 1].11 The
no-arbitrage condition that determines vt is
rt =
t + _vt   tvt
vt
, (10)
which states that the rate of return on vt must equal the interest rate. The return on vt is
the sum of monopolistic prot t, capital gain _vt and expected capital loss tvt, where t is
the rate of creative destruction.
Competitive entrepreneurs devote Rt units of nal goods to R&D. The free-entry condi-
tion of R&D is
tvt = (1  s)Rt, (11)
where the policy parameter s 2 (0; 1) is the rate of R&D subsidies and tvt is the expected
return on R&D. We assume that t is an increasing function in R&D spending Rt given by
t =
'Rt
Zt
, (12)
where Zt is the level of technology in the economy and captures in a simple way increasing
R&D di¢ culty due to an increasing-complexity e¤ect of technology.12 Combining (11) and
(12) yields
vt =
1  s
'
Zt, (13)
which shows that invention value vt is proportional to technology level Zt and that vt is
decreasing in R&D subsidy s for a given Zt. Intuitively, for a given Zt, the free-entry
condition implies that an increase in subsidy s makes R&D cheaper and leads to a decrease
in the price of inventions. In equilibrium, this decrease in the value of inventions is caused
by a higher rate of creative destruction.
11We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi et
al. (2007) for a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium as the unique rational-expectation
equilibrium in the Schumpeterian model.
12Venturini (2012) provides empirical evidence for the presence of increasing R&D di¢ culty.
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2.5 Government
The government decides on the level  of patent protection in the economy. Also, it collects
tax revenue to nance R&D subsidies and non-productive government expenditureGt subject
to the following balanced-budget condition:
 twt = sRt +Gt, (14)
where Gt = yt is assumed to be proportional to output. The parameter   Gt=yt  0 is
the ratio of government expenditure to output.
3 Solving the model
In this section, we proceed to solve the model as follows. Section 3.1 denes the equilibrium.
Section 3.2 shows that the aggregate economy always jumps to a unique balanced growth
path and explores the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on the aggregate growth
rate of the economy. Section 3.3 shows that the wealth distribution is stationary, and hence,
it is exogenously determined by its initial condition. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 show that income
and consumption distributions are also stationary, but they are endogenously determined by
patent protection and R&D subsidies.
3.1 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fct(h); at(h); yt; xt(i); lt(i); Rtg and a time path
of prices fwt; rt; pt(i); vtg. Also, at each instance of time, the following conditions hold:
 households h 2 [0; 1] maximize utility taking fwt; rtg as given;
 competitive rms produce nal good yt to maximize prot taking prices as given;
 each monopolistic rm i produces intermediate good xt(i) and chooses flt(i); pt(i)g to
maximize prot taking wt as given;
 competitive R&D entrepreneurs choose Rt to maximize expected prot taking fwt; vtg
as given;
 the market-clearing condition for labor holds such that R 1
0
lt(i)di = 1;
 the market-clearing condition for nal goods holds such that R 1
0
ct(h)dh+Rt+Gt = yt;
 the total value of household assets equals the value of all monopolistic rms such thatR 1
0
at(h)dh = vt.
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3.2 Aggregate economy
Aggregate technology Zt is dened as
Zt  exp
Z 1
0
nt(i)di ln z

= exp
Z t
0
!d! ln z

, (15)
where the last equality uses the law of large numbers. From (9), we see that lt(i) = lt for all
i 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, substituting (6) into (4) yields
yt = Ztlt = Zt, (16)
where the second equality uses lt = 1. Di¤erentiating the log of Zt in (15) with respect to
time yields the growth rate of technology given by
_Zt
Zt
= t ln z, (17)
where t = 'Rt=Zt from (12). The following proposition shows that the aggregate economy
jumps to a unique balanced growth path along which aggregate variables grow at the same
rate as technology.
Proposition 1 The aggregate economy jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced
growth path along which variables fct; yt; wt; t; vtg grow at the same rate as technology Zt.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given Proposition 1, we impose balanced growth on (10) to derive
vt =
t
r   g +  =
t
+ 
, (18)
where g denotes the steady-state growth rate of technology. Substituting (18) into (13) yields
the steady-state arrival rate of innovation given by
 =
'
1  s
t
Zt
   = '
1  s
  1

  , (19)
where the second equality uses (8) and (16). Therefore, the steady-state growth rate of
technology is
g =  ln z =

'
1  s
  1

  

ln z. (20)
Di¤erentiating (20) with respect to  and s respectively yields
@g
@
=
' ln z
1  s
1
2
> 0,
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@g
@s
=
' ln z
(1  s)2
  1

> 0,
which show that a strengthening of patent protection  and a raise in R&D subsidy s both
lead to an increase in the technology growth rate g. These aggregate e¤ects of patent breadth
and R&D subsidies are quite common in theoretical studies, such as Peretto (1998), Li (2001)
and Chu (2011), and also consistent with empirical studies, such as Brown et al. (2017) and
Minniti and Venturini (2017). The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 The steady-state equilibrium growth rate of technology is increasing in the
level  of patent protection and the rate s of R&D subsidies.
Proof. Equation (20) shows that g is increasing in  and s.
3.3 Wealth distribution
At time 0, the share of assets owned by household h is exogenously given by a;0(h) 
a0(h)=a0, which has a general distribution function fa with a mean of one and a standard
deviation of a > 0. From (2), the aggregate value of nancial assets evolves according to
_at = rtat + (1   t)wt   ct, (21)
where at 
R 1
0
at(h)dh is the total value of nancial assets owned by all households. Com-
bining (2) and (21) yields the law of motion for a;t(h)  at(h)=at given by
_a;t(h)
a;t(h)
=
_at(h)
at(h)
  _at
at
=
ct   (1   t)wt
at
  ct(h)  (1   t)wt
at(h)
, (22)
which can be re-expressed as
_a;t(h) =
ct   (1   t)wt
at
a;t(h)  c;t(h)ct   (1   t)wt
at
, (23)
where consumption share c;t(h)  ct(h)=ct is a stationary variable. From (3), _ct(h)=ct(h) =
_ct=ct, which in turn implies that _c;t(h)=c;t(h) = 0 and that c;t(h) = c;0(h) for all t > 0.
Then, recall that the aggregate economy is always on the balanced growth path along which
ct=at and wt=at are stationary. We will also show that the steady-state equilibrium tax rate
 is stationary. Therefore, (23) is a one-dimensional di¤erential equation, which describes
the potential evolution of a;t(h) given an initial a;0(h). In the appendix, we show that
the coe¢ cient on a;t(h) in (23) is positive. Together with the fact that a;t(h) is a state
variable, the only solution of (23) consistent with long-run stability is _a;t(h) = 0 for all t,
which is achieved by consumption share c;0(h) jumping to its steady-state value shown in
the appendix.
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Proposition 3 For every household h, its asset share is constant over time and exogenously
determined at time 0 such that a;t(h) = a;0(h) for all t.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that as an equilibrium outcome, the initial wealth distribution re-
mains unchanged over time. Therefore, the degree of wealth inequality is determined by the
initial dispersion of asset holdings in the economy. However, as we will show in the next two
sections, both the income distribution and the consumption distribution are endogenously
determined, which in turn implies that the degrees of income and consumption inequality
can be a¤ected by policy instruments, such as patent protection and R&D subsidies.
3.4 Income distribution
Before-tax income earned by household h is
It(h)  rtat(h) + wt. (24)
Total before-tax income earned by all households is
It = rtat + wt. (25)
Combining these two equations yields the share of income earned by household h given by
I;t(h)  It(h)
It
=
rtata;0(h) + wt
rtat + wt
. (26)
Lets begin by considering a simple distribution of a;0(h). Suppose for now that there
are just two types of household h 2 fE;Wg. Households indexed by W are workers, who
receive wage income but do not own any nancial asset. In this case, the share of income
owned by any household W is I;t(W ) = wt=(rtat + wt). Households indexed by E are
entrepreneurs, who receive wage income and equally own all the nancial assets. In this case,
the share of income owned by any household E is I;t(E) = (rtat=e+wt)=(rtat +wt), where
e 2 (0; 1) denotes the mass of entrepreneurs among the unit continuum of all households.
Income inequality measured by the relative income between an entrepreneur and a worker
is I;t(E)=I;t(W ) = 1 + 1ertat=wt,
13 which indicates two e¤ects of innovation on income
inequality. First, I;t(E)=I;t(W ) is increasing in rt capturing the e¤ect of innovation via the
interest rate on income inequality. Second, I;t(E)=I;t(W ) is increasing in at=wt capturing
the e¤ect of innovation via the value of assets (relative to wage) on income inequality. Putting
these two e¤ects together, we have rtat=wt, which captures the e¤ects of innovation on income
inequality via asset income relative to wage income.14
13A small value of e captures the case in which the returns to innovation are appropriated by a small
number of successful entrepreneurs, and implies a high degree of income inequality.
14Given that nancial assets are usually owned by top-income earners, rtat=wt also relates to the important
concept of top-income inequality explored in Aghion et al. (2015) and Jones and Kim (2017).
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Lets turn to a general distribution of a;0(h). Equation (26) implies that the distribution
of income share at time t has a mean of one and a standard deviation of
I;t =
sZ 1
0
[I;t(h)  1]2 dh = rtat
rtat + wt
a =
rtat=wt
1 + rtat=wt
a, (27)
which is increasing in rtat=wt capturing the above-mentioned interest-rate and asset-value
e¤ects of innovation on income inequality. From (3), we have rt = + g. From (13), we have
vt = (1   s)Zt=', and we also know that at = vt. From (9) and (16), we have wt = Zt=.
Substituting these conditions into (27) yields
I;t = I =
(+ g)(1  s)
(+ g)(1  s)+ 'a (28)
for all t. Equation (28) implies that the distribution function fI of income share has a mean
of one and a standard deviation of I . Here we measure income inequality by the standard
deviation I of income share, which is equivalent to the coe¢ cient of variation of before-tax
income.15 Equation (28) shows that income inequality I is lower than wealth inequality
a, and this nding is consistent with the evidence documented in Budria-Rodriguez et al.
(2002). Substituting the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g(; s) from (20) into (28)
yields
I =
(1  ln z)(1  s) +  1

' ln z
(1  ln z)(1  s) +  1

' ln z + '=
a =
1
1 + '
(1 ln z)(1 s)+( 1)' ln z
a, (29)
which is increasing in 
  (1 ln z)(1 s)+( 1)' ln z
'
.16 Di¤erentiating 
 with respect to  and
s yields17
@

@
=
(1  ln z)(1  s) + ' ln z
'
> 0,
@

@s
=  (1  ln z)
'
,
which is negative (positive) if 1  ln z > 0 (1  ln z < 0).
15If we considered after-tax income, then the coe¢ cient of variation of after-tax income would be
I =
rtat
rtat+(1 )wta =
(+g)(1 s)
(+g)(1 s)+(1 )'a. For a given tax rate  (which can be achieved by making
 endogenous to balance the governments budget constraint), the e¤ects of s and  on g and I would be
the same as the case of before-tax income. In the next section, we will explore how an endogenous tax rate
 responds to s and .
16If we captured the e¤ects of education quality by ', then income inequality would be decreasing in
education quality because a larger ' increases wage income relative to asset income despite its positive e¤ect
on the interest rate.
17It is useful to note that I > 0 requires (1   ln z)(1   s) +  1 ' ln z > 0, which in turn implies that
(1  ln z)(1  s) + ' ln z > 0.
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Proposition 4 The degree of income inequality is increasing in the level  of patent protec-
tion but decreasing (increasing) in the rate s of R&D subsidies if ln z < 1 (ln z > 1).
Proof. Equation (29) shows that I is increasing in  but decreasing (increasing) in s if
1  ln z > 0 (1  ln z < 0).
Recall that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g(; s) is increasing in both  and
s. Equation (28) shows that an increase in g leads to an increase in income inequality I by
increasing the real interest rate and asset income, which is the cause of income inequality
in the model. This is the symmetric interest-rate e¤ect of patent protection  and R&D
subsidy s on income inequality I . However, these two policy instruments have an additional
asset-value e¤ect on income inequality captured by the term (1  s) in (28), and this asset-
value e¤ect is asymmetric between  and s. To understand this asymmetric asset-value
e¤ect, one can consider the ratio at=wt = vt=wt = (1   s)=' derived from (9), (13) and
(16). Interestingly, at=wt is decreasing in R&D subsidy s but increasing in patent protection
. Intuitively, an increase in patent protection reduces the share of wage income as (9)
shows and raises the share of prot income as (8) shows, thereby increasing asset income,
which is heterogeneous across households and the source of income inequality in the model,
relative to wage income. In contrast, an increase in R&D subsidies reduces asset income
by decreasing the value of inventions as (13) shows. Therefore, while strengthening patent
protection causes only positive interest-rate and asset-value e¤ects on income inequality,
raising R&D subsidies carries both a positive interest-rate e¤ect and a negative asset-value
e¤ect on income inequality. The positive interest-rate e¤ect is stronger when the quality step
size is larger because @g=@s is increasing in the quality step size z as (20) shows. Equation
(29) shows that if ln z is larger (smaller) than one, then a raise in R&D subsidies would have
a positive (negative) e¤ect on income inequality. The empirical value of z is often considered
to be less than 1.20;18 see for example Laitner and Stolyarov (2013). Therefore, under an
empirically realistic quality step size, raising R&D subsidies has an overall negative e¤ect on
income inequality.
The above results are driven by an implicit assumption that R&D subsidies a¤ect only
new inventions whereas patent breadth a¤ects both new inventions and previously patented
inventions, which are assets owned by households. The value of these assets is at = vt =
t=( + ) =
 1

yt=( + ). Therefore, the value of assets relative to wage is at=wt =
( 1)=(+), which is decreasing in the rate of creative destruction .19 Suppose we assume
that patent breadth a¤ects only new inventions but not previously patented inventions.
Then, before the arrival of new inventions, a larger patent breadth does not yet have a
positive e¤ect via the markup  on the value of existing assets and only causes a negative
e¤ect on the value of assets by increasing the rate of creative destruction . In this case, the
e¤ect of patent breadth  is similar to the e¤ect of R&D subsidies until the arrival of new
inventions at which point the positive e¤ect of the markup  on at=wt appears.
18It is useful to note that ln(1:2)  0:182 < 1.
19For a given , at=wt is decreasing in  because creative destruction decreases the present value of future
prots. However, the interest rate r = + g = +  ln z is increasing in . Therefore, the overall e¤ect of 
on income inequality, which is determined by rat=wt, is ambiguous.
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3.5 Consumption distribution
From (2), consumption by household h is
ct(h) =

rt   _at(h)
at(h)

at(h) + (1  )wt = at(h) + (1  )wt, (30)
where the second equality uses (3) and the balanced-growth condition _at(h)=at(h) = _ct(h)=ct(h).
Aggregate consumption is
ct = at + (1  )wt. (31)
Combining (30) and (31) yields the share of consumption by household h given by
c;t(h)  ct(h)
ct
=
at(h) + (1  )wt
at + (1  )wt . (32)
Equation (32) implies that the distribution of consumption share at time t has a mean
of one and a standard deviation of
c;t =
sZ 1
0
[c;t(h)  1]2 dh = at
at + (1  )wta, (33)
Following the same derivations as in the previous section, we obtain
c;t = c =
(1  s)
(1  s)+ (1  )'a, (34)
where the steady-state equilibrium tax rate  can be derived as follows by substituting (9),
(12), (16) and (19) into (14):
 = 
sR +G
y
= 

s
'
+ 

= s

1
1  s
  1

  
'

+ , (35)
which is increasing in s and . Substituting (35) into (34) yields
c =
(1  s)
(  ')+ '(1  s)=(1  s)a =
1

a, (36)
which is decreasing in   1

h
 '
1 s +
'
(1 s)2

1

  s
i
. Di¤erentiating  with respect to 
and s respectively yields
@
@
=   '
(1  s)2
1
2
< 0,
@
@s
 1
(1  s)2

  ( + 1)'+ 2'
1  s

1

  s

,
which can be positive or negative.
As before, we measure consumption inequality by the standard deviation of consumption
share, which is equivalent to the coe¢ cient of variation of consumption. Equation (33) shows
that consumption inequality c is independent of the interest rate because a higher interest
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rate leads to a higher saving rate such that consumption ct(h) is always a constant fraction 
of asset at(h) due to the log utility function in (1). Therefore, unlike income inequality, the
interest-rate e¤ect of patents and R&D subsidies is absent under consumption inequality.20
Consequently, for a given tax rate  , we are left with the asymmetric asset-value e¤ect of
patents and R&D subsidies captured by the term (1   s) in vt=wt = (1   s)=' and in
(34). As in the case of income inequality, a strengthening of patent protection has a positive
asset-value e¤ect on consumption inequality by raising asset income whereas an increase in
R&D subsidies causes a negative asset-value e¤ect. However, the tax rate  is also a function
of  and s. When either  or s increases, R&D spending increases, which in turn leads to
a higher tax rate  as (35) shows and worsens consumption inequality c because the tax is
levied on wage income wt rather than asset income, which is the source of inequality in the
model. Therefore, strengthening patent protection increases consumption inequality due to
the positive asset-income and tax-rate e¤ects whereas raising R&D subsidies has an overall
ambiguous e¤ect on consumption inequality due to the negative asset-income e¤ect and the
positive tax-rate e¤ect.
Proposition 5 The degree of consumption inequality is increasing in the level  of patent
protection but can be decreasing or increasing in the rate s of R&D subsidies.
Proof. Equation (34) shows that c is increasing in  but can be decreasing or increasing
in s.
4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to data in the US in order to provide a quantitative
illustration on the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies. The model features the
following aggregate parameters: f; s; '; ; z; g. We set the discount rate  to a conventional
value of 0.05. We follow Impullitti (2010) to set the R&D subsidy rate s in the US to
0.188. We calibrate the value of R&D productivity ' by setting the time between arrivals
of innovation to 1= = 8 years.21 As for the patent protection level , we calibrate its
value by setting the R&D share of GDP to R=y = 0:028. As for the quality step size z,
we calibrate its value by setting the long-run growth rate g to 2%. Finally, the ratio  of
government spending to GDP is set to 0.2 as in Belo et al. (2013). These empirical moments
are representative of the US economy. Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameter values.
Under these parameter values, consumption inequality c is lower than income inequality
20In the case of an isoelastic utility function, this neutral interest-rate e¤ect of the two policy instruments on
consumption inequality would become ambiguous. Specically, if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
were less (greater) than unity, then the interest-rate e¤ect of the two instruments on consumption inequality
would be positive (negative). As for the asset-value e¤ect on consumption inequality, it would still be
di¤erent for the two instruments.
21In the literature, studies have considered di¤erent values for the arrival rate of innovations. For example,
Caballero and Ja¤e (2002) use a structural model to estimate an innovation-arrival rate of 4% whereas
Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) use a growth model to calibrate an innovation-arrival rate of 33%. We consider
an intermediate value of 12.5% within this range.
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I , and this nding is consistent with the evidence documented in Krueger and Perri (2006)
and Blundell et al. (2008).
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
 s '  z 
0.050 0.188 4.464 1.033 1.174 0.200
The policy experiments that we consider are to increase separately the R&D subsidy rate
s and the patent protection level  such that the R&D share of GDP R=y increases by one-
tenth from 0.0280 to 0.0308 in each case, which in turn leads to the same proportional increase
in the equilibrium growth rate. Table 2 reports the resulting implications of each of these
policy changes on economic growth g, income inequality I and consumption inequality c.
Table 2a shows that in order to increase the R&D share of GDP R=y by one-tenth, patent
protection level  needs to increase from 1.033 to 1.035, in which case the growth rate g
increases from 2.0% to 2.2%. This increase in the growth rate leads to a corresponding
increase in the interest rate, which in turn drives up income inequality I . In this case,
the coe¢ cient of variation of income increases by 3.06%.22 As for consumption inequality
c, the coe¢ cient of variation of consumption increases negligibly by 0.36% because the
positive interest-rate e¤ect is absent. Although the positive asset-value e¤ect remains and
the positive tax-rate e¤ect appears, they are relatively minor in magnitude in the case of
patent protection.
Table 2b shows that in order to increase the R&D share of GDP R=y by one-tenth, the
R&D subsidy rate s needs to increase from 0.188 to 0.242. The increase in the growth rate
g is the same as above and gives rise to a positive interest-rate e¤ect on income inequality.
However, the magnitude of the increase in s is large, which in turn gives rise to a strong
negative asset-value e¤ect on income inequality I . In this case, the coe¢ cient of variation
of income decreases by 3.95%. As for consumption inequality c, the coe¢ cient of variation
of consumption decreases even more by 6.33% because the positive interest-rate e¤ect is
now absent. Although the positive tax-rate e¤ect appears, its magnitude is relatively minor
because R&D spending is a small share of GDP, and hence, the negative asset-value e¤ect
remains the dominant force.
Table 2c considers the case in which both policy instruments change simultaneously.
Specically, the level of patent protection  increases from 1.033 to 1.035 as in case a whereas
the rate of R&D subsidies increases from 0.188 to 0.242 as in case b. In this case, we nd
that the overall e¤ects are dominated by R&D subsidies such that the coe¢ cient of variation
of income decreases by 0.90% whereas the coe¢ cient of variation of consumption decreases
by 5.96%. This is due to the relatively large change in the R&D subsidy rate s. The smaller
decrease in income inequality than before is due to the larger increase in the growth rate to
2.41%, which causes a larger interest-rate e¤ect on income inequality than before.
22Here the change in income inequality I is reported as proportional change (i.e., I  newI =oldI   1).
16
Table 2a: E¤ects of patent protection
! 1:035 R=y g I c
0.0308 2.20% 3.06% 0.36%
Table 2b: E¤ects of R&D subsidies
s! 0:242 R=y g I c
0.0308 2.20% -3.95% -6.33%
Table 2c: E¤ects of both instruments
! 1:035 R=y g I c
s! 0:242 0.0338 2.41% -0.90% -5.96%
In the rest of this section, we perform the following hypothetical experiments. In the
US, the R&D share of GDP increases from 0.024 in 1995 to 0.028 in 2015. We use HP lter
to extract the trend of the R&D share of GDP from 1995 to 2015. Then, we consider two
hypothetical scenarios. First, suppose the increasing trend of the R&D share of GDP is
due to a gradual increase in the level of patent breadth. Then, we plot the resulting e¤ects
on income and consumption inequality. Second, suppose the increasing trend of the R&D
share of GDP is due to a gradual increase in the rate of R&D subsidies. Then, we plot the
resulting e¤ects on income and consumption inequality. These results are summarized in
the following gure. Figure 1 simulates the percent changes in inequality and shows that
if the increase in R&D were driven by a strengthening of patent protection, then income
and consumption inequality would have increased by 4.10% and 0.47% respectively. If the
increase in R&D were driven by an increase in R&D subsidies instead, then income and
consumption inequality would have decreased by 5.68% and 8.81% respectively.
Figure 1: E¤ects of patents and subsidies on inequality
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4.1 Robustness check: R&D share of GDP
Starting from this section, we consider a number of robustness checks on our simulation
exercise to illustrate how the numerical results would change under di¤erent assumptions.
In this section, we examine data on the R&D share of GDP. As Comin (2004) argues,
data on R&D expenditures reported by rms may not capture all the resources devoted
to innovation-related activities. Here we consider a rough exercise by doubling the R&D
share of GDP from 0.028 to 0.056. Table 3 reports the re-calibrated parameter values and
shows that because R=y is increasing in , the markup ratio  increases from 1.033 to 1.068,
which is a more realistic value.23 The re-calibrated value of R&D productivity ' decreases
because a lower R&D productivity is required (given a higher R&D spending R=y) in order
to keep the innovation arrival rate  at 0.125 as in the previous section. Table 4 shows
that the increases in income and consumption inequality under patent protection become
larger at 3.27% and 0.76% respectively whereas the decreases in income and consumption
inequality under R&D subsidies become slightly smaller at 3.90% and 5.96% respectively.
However, the qualitative pattern remains that income and consumption inequality increases
under patent protection but decreases under R&D subsidies and that the magnitude of the
changes under R&D subsidies is larger than under patent protection. Finally, when both
instruments change simultaneously, the overall e¤ects are still dominated by R&D subsidies
such that income inequality decreases by 0.64% whereas consumption inequality decreases
by 5.19%. Therefore, our results are robust to considering biases in R&D share R=y.
Table 3: Calibrated parameter values
 s '  z 
0.050 0.188 2.232 1.068 1.174 0.200
Table 4a: E¤ects of patent protection
! 1:073 R=y g I c
0.0616 2.20% 3.27% 0.76%
Table 4b: E¤ects of R&D subsidies
s! 0:242 R=y g I c
0.242 0.0616 2.20% -3.90% -5.96%
Table 4c: E¤ects of both instruments
! 1:073 R=y g I c
s! 0:242 0.0676 2.41% -0.64% -5.19%
4.2 Robustness check: technology growth rate
In the previous sections, we calibrate the value of the quality step size z by targeting the
long-run growth rate of output per capita in the US. It is equally reasonable to calibrate
the value of z by targeting the long-run growth rate of technology instead. In this case,
we re-calibrate the parameter values by setting g = 1%. Table 5 reports the re-calibrated
23For example, Jones and Williams (2000) report a range of estimates for the markup from 1.05 to 1.40.
Laitner and Stolyarov (2004) use stock market data to estimate a markup of 1.10.
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parameter values and shows that the calibrated value of z decreases from 1.174 to 1.08324
(because a lower g =  ln z implies a lower z) whereas other parameter values remain largely
the same. Under the new parameter values, the long-run growth rate g increases by the same
proportion of one-tenth from 1.0% to 1.1%. Table 6 shows that the pattern of changes in
inequality is the same as before except that the increase in income inequality under patent
protection becomes smaller at 2.11% whereas the decrease in income inequality under R&D
subsidies becomes larger at 5.00%. Finally, when both instruments change simultaneously,
the overall e¤ects continue to be mostly driven by R&D subsidies such that income inequality
decreases by 2.91% whereas consumption inequality decreases by 5.19%. The decrease in
income inequality is larger than in the previous section because the increase in the growth
rate is now smaller, which in turn implies that the positive interest-rate e¤ect is also smaller.
In any case, our results are robust to considering biases in the growth rate g.
Table 5: Calibrated parameter values
 s '  z 
0.050 0.188 2.232 1.068 1.083 0.200
Table 6a: E¤ects of patent protection
! 1:073 R=y g I c
0.0616 1.10% 2.11% 0.76%
Table 6b: E¤ects of R&D subsidies
s! 0:242 R=y g I c
0.0616 1.10% -5.00% -5.96%
Table 6c: E¤ects of both instruments
! 1:073 R=y g I c
s! 0:242 0.0676 1.21% -2.91% -5.19%
5 Extensions of the model
In this section, we consider a number of extensions to the benchmark model in order to
explore the robustness of our results. In Section 5.1, we change the lab-equipment innovation
specication to the knowledge-driven innovation specication under which R&D uses labor
as the factor input. In Section 5.2, we change the quality-ladder model to a variety-expanding
model.
5.1 R&D labor
We now assume that R&D uses labor instead of nal good as the factor input. Under this
assumption, (12) is modied as follows:
t = 'lr;t. (37)
24This value for the quality step size is closer to the one in Garcia-Macia et al. (2016). From their
estimated parameter values, the average quality step size is 1.071 in the latest period.
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In this case, the free-entry condition of R&D becomes
tvt = (1  s)wtlr;t , 'vt = (1  s)wt, (38)
where the second equality uses (37). Substituting (8), (9) and (18) into (38) yields
'(  1)
+ 
=
1  s
lx
, (39)
where lx denotes production labor. Substituting (37) and the resource constraint lx + lr = 1
into (39) yields the equilibrium R&D labor given by
lr(
+
; s
+
) =
1
  s

  1  (1  s) 
'

, (40)
which is increasing patent breadth  and R&D subsidy s. Therefore, the steady-state equi-
librium growth rate g =  ln z = (' ln z)lr(; s) is also increasing in  and s.
From (27), the standard deviation of before-tax income share is
I;t =
rtat
rtat + wt
a =
(+ g)at=wt
1 + (+ g)at=wt
a, (41)
where the relative value between assets and wage is given by at=wt = (1   s)=' from (38).
Therefore, an increase in the level of patent breadth leads to a higher degree of income
inequality via only the interest-rate channel r = +g. The asset-value e¤ect at=wt = (1 s)='
of patent breadth is now absent because the monopolistic-prot e¤ect and the creative-
destruction e¤ect of  exactly cancel each other in this case. In contrast, an increase in
the rate of R&D subsidies has both positive and negative e¤ects on income inequality. The
positive e¤ect arises via the interest-rate channel r = + g whereas the negative e¤ect arises
via the asset-value channel at=wt = (1   s)='. In other words, although the positive asset-
value e¤ect of patent breadth becomes absent when R&D uses labor as the factor input, the
overall e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies on income inequality remain the same
as before. We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 When R&D uses labor as the factor input, the degree of income inequality
is increasing in the level  of patent protection but decreasing (increasing) in the rate s of
R&D subsidies if z is below (above) a threshold.25
Proof. Substituting at=wt = (1  s)=' and g = (' ln z)lr into (+ g)at=wt yields
(+ g)
at
wt
=

+ (' ln z)lr(
+
; s
+
)

1  s
'
, (42)
where lr(; s) is given by (40). Equation (42) implies that (+ g)at=wt is increasing in  but
decreasing (increasing) in s if z is su¢ ciently small (large). Then, recall from (41) that I
is increasing in (+ g)at=wt.
25It can be shown that ln z < 1 is now a su¢ cient condition (but no longer necessary) for an increase in
R&D subsidies to decrease income inequality. Derivations are available upon request.
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5.2 Variety expansion
We now consider a variety-expanding growth model to examine the robustness of our results.
To begin, we replace the Cobb-Douglas production function of nal good in (4) by the
following CES production function:
yt =
Z Nt
0
x"t(i)di
1="
, (43)
where the parameter " 2 (0; 1) determines the elasticity   1=(1 ") of substitution between
intermediate goods. Then, we replace the production function of intermediate goods in (6)
by a simple one-to-one production function xt(i) = lx;t(i). In this case, the familiar prot-
maximizing price of xt(i) is given by pt(i) = wt=". To introduce patent breadth, we introduce
a patent policy parameter  such that pt(i) = minf; 1="gwt. In this case, the amount of
prot earned by intermediate good xt(i) is given by
t(i) = pt(i)xt(i)  wtxt(i) = (  1)wtlx;t(i). (44)
It can be shown that the equilibrium features symmetry such that lx;t(i) = lx;t=Nt for all
i 2 [0; Nt]. In this case, the production function in (43) simplies to
yt = N
1="
t xt(i) = N
(1 ")="
t lx;t, (45)
which implies that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of output is gy = gN(1  ")=".
As in Section 5.1, we consider the knowledge-driven innovation specication under which
R&D uses labor such that
_Nt = 'Ntlr;t. (46)
In this case, the free-entry condition of R&D is given by
_Ntvt = (1  s)wtlr;t , 'Ntvt = (1  s)wt, (47)
where the second equality uses (46). The no-arbitrage value of an invention on the balanced
growth path is given by
vt =
t
r   g =
t
+ gy   g , (48)
where the second equality uses (3) and the steady-state equilibrium condition gc = gy. It
can be shown that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of t is given by g = gy  gN .26
Therefore, we have vt = t=( + gN), which shows that for a given t, the value vt of an
invention is decreasing in the growth rate gN of varieties. Intuitively, more varieties in the
future will reduce the market share of each invention and lower its present value.
To solve for the steady-state equilibrium growth rate gN of varieties, we substitute (44)
and (48) into (47) to obtain
'(  1)
+ gN
=
1  s
Ntlx;t(i)
=
1  s
lx
, (49)
26It can be shown that wt and yt grow at the same rate on the balanced growth path.
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where gN = 'lr. Substituting the resource constraint lx + lr = 1 into (49) yields
lr(
+
; s
+
) =
1
  s

  1  (1  s) 
'

, (50)
which is increasing patent breadth  and R&D subsidy s. Therefore, the steady-state output
growth rate gy = gN(1  ")=" = 'lr(; s)(1  ")=" is also increasing in  and s.
The standard deviation of before-tax income share is
I;t =
rtat
rtat + wt
a =
(+ gy)at=wt
1 + (+ gy)at=wt
a, (51)
where the relative value between assets and wage is given by at=wt = Ntvt=wt = (1   s)='
from (47). Therefore, an increase in the level of patent breadth leads to a higher degree of
income inequality via only the interest-rate channel r =  + gy. In contrast, an increase in
the rate of R&D subsidies has both positive and negative e¤ects on income inequality. The
positive e¤ect arises via the interest-rate channel r = +gy whereas the negative e¤ect arises
via the asset-value channel at=wt = (1   s)='. As in the knowledge-driven quality-ladder
model in Section 5.1, although the positive asset-value e¤ect of patent breadth is absent, the
overall e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies on income inequality remain the same
as before. We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 In the variety-expanding model, the degree of income inequality is increasing
in the level  of patent protection but decreasing (increasing) in the rate s of R&D subsidies
if " is above (below) a threshold.
Proof. Substituting at=wt = (1  s)=' and gy = 'lr(; s)(1  ")=" into (+ gy)at=wt yields
(+ gy)
at
wt
=

+ '
1  "
"
lr(
+
; s
+
)

1  s
'
, (52)
where lr(; s) is given by (50). Equation (52) implies that ( + gy)at=wt is increasing in 
but decreasing (increasing) in s if " is su¢ ciently large (small). Then, recall from (51) that
I is increasing in (+ gy)at=wt.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the e¤ects of innovation policies, such as patent protection
and R&D subsidies, on innovation and economic growth as well as income inequality, which
is often neglected by studies in the literature. We have shown that policy instruments
may have similar aggregate e¤ects on innovation and economic growth but very di¤erent
distributional e¤ects on inequality. Specically, we nd that strengthening patent protection
causes a moderate increase in income inequality and consumption inequality whereas raising
R&D subsidies causes a relatively large decrease in both income inequality and consumption
inequality. These results suggest that if the objective of a government is to enhance economic
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growth and reduce inequality, then the government should raise R&D subsidies instead of
(or at least in combination with) strengthening patent protection. In our analysis, we have
focused on a non-distortionary tax instrument. Considering more realistic distortionary tax
instruments may lead to additional insights and di¤erent implications on before-tax and
after-tax income inequality.
In this study, we have considered a Schumpeterian model with heterogeneity in household
asset holdings. Our model focuses on asset income inequality instead of wage income inequal-
ity for two reasons. First, wage inequality in the form of skill premium has received much
attention in the literature, but only a relatively small number of studies have considered
asset income inequality in the Schumpeterian growth model. Second, empirical studies, such
as Atkinson (2000, 2003) and Piketty (2014), have shown that inequality in asset income is
playing an increasingly important role.27 Finally, although our model does not feature tan-
gible assets such as physical capital, intangible assets are an important part of the modern
economy.28
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. From (8), (9), (13) and (16), we have
_vt
vt
=
_Zt
Zt
=
_yt
yt
=
_wt
wt
=
_t
t
, (A1)
which shows that fyt; wt; t; vtg grow at the same rate as technology Zt. We also know that
the value of inventions equals the value of assets such that vt = at; therefore, at also grows at
the same rate as technology Zt. Recall from (17) that the growth rate of Zt is _Zt=Zt = t ln z.
In the rest of this proof, we will show that t jumps to a unique and stable steady state, so
that _Zt=Zt also jumps to its steady-state value. From (12), we have
t =
'Rt
Zt
= '

1     ct
Zt

, (A2)
where the second equality uses yt = ct+Rt+Gt, yt = Zt andGt = yt. If we dene t  ct=Zt,
then t = '(1      t), which shows that the dynamics of t is solely determined by the
dynamics of t. Taking the log of t and di¤erentiating it with respect to time yield
_t
t
=
_ct
ct
 
_Zt
Zt
=
_ct
ct
  _vt
vt
, (A3)
where the second equality uses (A1). Recall from (3) that _ct(h)=ct(h) = _ct=ct. Then,
substituting (3) and (10) into (A3) yields
_t
t
=
t
vt
  t    = t
vt
  '(1     t)  , (A4)
where the second equality uses (A2). Substituting (8), (13) and (16) into (A4) yields
_t
t
=
'
1  s
  1

  '(1     t)   = 't   , (A5)
where we dene a composite parameter   '(1  ) +   '
1 s
 1

, which is assumed to be
positive by imposing parameter restrictions.29 Equation (A5) shows that the dynamics of t
is characterized by instability, so that t must jump to its unique and saddle-point stable
steady state given by  = ='. At the steady state, ct and Zt grow at the same rate given
by g =  ln z = '(1     ) ln z = ['(1  )  ] ln z as in (20).
29Otherwise, t and ct would be negative.
28
Proof of Proposition 3. Substituting (9), (13), (16) and at = vt into (23) yields
_a;t(h) = '
t   (1  )=
1  s a;t(h)  '
c;t(h)t   (1  )=
1  s , (A6)
which also uses t  ct=Zt. Recall from (3) that _ct(h)=ct(h) = _ct=ct, which in turn implies
_c;t(h) = 0 for all t. Substituting c;t(h) = c;0(h) and t = =' for all t into (A6) yields
_a;t(h) =
  '(1  )=
1  s a;t(h) 
c;0(h)  '(1  )=
1  s . (A7)
Therefore, the dynamic property of a;t(h) depends on the sign of [  '(1  )=]=(1  s).
To see that  > '(1  )=, one can use (35) to show that
 >
'(1  )

, s < 1. (A8)
Therefore, the coe¢ cient on a;t(h) in (A7) is positive, which in turn implies that _a;t(h) = 0
for all t is the only solution of (A7) consistent with long-run stability. Finally, imposing
_a;t(h) = 0 on (A7) yields the steady-state value of c;t(h) given by
c;0(h) =
'(1  )

+

1  '(1  )


a;0(h). (A9)
Equation (A9) shows that @c;0(h)=@a;0(h) > 0 given  > '(1  )=.
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